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Abstract 
Both organisational justice and behavioural ethics are concerned with questions of ‘right and 
wrong’ in the context of work organisations. Until recently they have developed largely 
independently of each other, choosing to focus on subtly different concerns, constructs and 
research questions. The last few years have, however, witnessed a significant growth in 
theoretical and empirical research integrating these closely related academic specialities. We 
review the organisational justice literature, illustrating the impact of behavioural ethics 
research on important fairness questions. We argue that organisational justice research is 
focused on four reoccurring issues; (i) why justice at work matters to individuals, (ii) how 
justice judgements are formed, (iii) the consequences of injustice, and (iv) the factors 
antecedent to justice perceptions. Current and future justice research has begun and will 
continue borrowing from the behavioural ethics literature in answering these questions. 
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New high profile cases of injustice and unethical behaviour in organisations appear ever-
present in the media. These stories cover a whole range of important issues, including (but 
not limited to) examples of business corruption, corporate avarice and greed, massive scale 
Ponzi schemes, the exploitation of people, mistreatment of  employees, and on-going 
ecological/environmental catastrophes. Whatever the story, it appears that employees, 
employers, consumers, and politicians across the globe are paying special attention to justice 
and ethical behaviour. 
The response of management scholars has been extensive but somewhat less 
impactful than might have otherwise been the case. Academic research has been limited by 
division. The study of moral work behaviour has been divided into two distinct scholarly 
traditions – organisational justice and behavioural ethics. While both organisational justice 
and behavioural ethics research are ostensibly concerned with questions of right and wrong in 
the context of work and organisations (Schminke et al., 1997), until recently these disciplines 
have largely developed independently of each other. They have chosen to focus on subtly 
different concerns, constructs, and research questions (Cropanzano and Stein, 2009).  
Research on organisational justice has generally focussed on how and why managers 
and their organisations are judged as (un)fair by employees, and how these perceptions 
impact their performance and well-being at work (for reviews, see Cohen-Charash, and 
Spector, 2001; Colquitt et al., 2001). Organisational justice research has thus tended to be 
more descriptive (what people actually do or think) than prescriptive (what people should do 
or think), seeking to discover the dimensions along which people determine that an outcome, 
procedure or interaction is considered fair or unfair rather than prescribing particular ethical 
norms or standards of justice. Yet scholars recognise that early organisational justice 
research, for example the work on distributive justice by first Homans (1961) and later 
Adams (1965),  was far more closely connected to, and derived from, wider philosophical 
debate on justice and morality (e.g. Cropanzano and Stein, 2009). Indeed, there is an 
assumption in the organisational justice literature that equity is the prevailing justice norm in 
the contemporary workplace, with the result that distributive justice judgements are typically 
assessed as a balance of efforts and outcomes. However, the organisational justice literature 
is mute as to the appropriateness or legitimacy of equity as a justice norm, and generally 
unconcerned with whether or not people think that equity should be the common norm. The 
interrelated nature of ethics and justice has only recently been explicitly revisited as a subject 
in the literature on deontic justice, which explores the innate ethical value of a concern for 
justice ‘for the sake of justice’.  
The investigation of justice as a practice can be distinguished from behavioural ethics 
research, which has traditionally been more concerned with examining individual (un)ethical 
actions and behaviours (e.g. lying, stealing, charitable giving, whistleblowing) in the context 
of larger social prescriptions, values, or norms (for reviews, see Bazerman and Tenbrunsel, 
2012; Treviño et al., 2006). In their review of the literature on ethical decision making, 
Tenbrunsel and Smith-Crowe (2008) lament the lack of agreement on what is and is not 
‘ethical’ or ‘moral’. Nevertheless, behavioural ethics research is specifically concerned with 
how people decide what they or others should do, and how they respond to other’s behaviours 
in terms of what they believe the other should or should not have done. The distinction 
between organizational justice as practice and behavioural ethics as normative or moral 
standards allows us to conceive of each as relatively independent variables that can affect or 
be related to each other in interesting and informative ways.         
The last few years, however, have witnessed a significant growth in theoretical and 
empirical research that has begun to integrate these closely related academic disciplines, in 
particular how ethics might influence the administration of justice or fairness or how 
experiences of (in)justice motivates ethical or unethical behaviours (e.g., Cropanzano and 
Stein, 2009). Given the rapid expansion and development of this literature, and its increasing 
relevance to both academics and practitioners, we feel that the time is now right for this 
special issue. Through this review and special issue we aim to provide an analysis of this 
emerging body of work, identify future research opportunities, and introduce a number of 
new theoretical and empirical studies that are working at this particular intersection of 
organisational justice and behavioural ethics. To illustrate these ideas, we will structure the 
remainder of this introductory discussion in sections that introduce a principle domain of the 
organisational justice literature, and then examine that body of scholarly work while 
integrating relevant research on behavioural ethics. In this way we aim to explicitly reconnect 
the field of organisational justice with ideas derived from research into ethics and normative 
behaviour.           
 
Organisational justice: A review and insights from behavioural ethics 
‘Justice’ involves a type of moral appraisal. In particular, an action is said to be ‘just’ or ‘fair’ 
if it conforms to certain standards of ethical propriety. For instance, it is considered fair to 
provide people with information about workplace changes that might impact their well-being 
(Bies, 1987; Sitkin and Bies, 1993). When management scholars discuss organisational 
justice, they are generally taking a descriptive approach (Cropanzano and Stein, 2009). That 
is, organisational scientists examine the antecedents of fairness perceptions, as well as the 
consequences of those evaluative judgements (Cropanzano and Greenberg, 1997). This 
descriptive approach is distinct from, though complementary to, the normative approach 
taken by philosophers and many legal scholars. Scholars who approach fairness normatively 
seek to understand the qualities of events that make them actually or objectively fair (e.g., 
Bazerman and Tenbrunsel, 2012; Sandel, 2009). Philosophical inquiry is important because it 
articulates broad standards of conduct that underpin our sense of fairness. Despite their 
differences, the descriptive approach taken by management scholars has been heavily 
influenced by its philosophical roots, as it extends philosophical inquiry by exploring how 
individuals respond when standards of justice are respected or violated (Cropanzano et al., 
2011).  
 
Considerations of structure 
‘Fairness’ is a difficult idea to define and organisational scientists have attempted to do so by 
providing a thorough description of the facets of justice as an experience. Research suggests 
that individuals evaluate at least three aspects of their work environment.  
 Distributive justice refers to the fairness of one’s outcomes from a decision-making 
system. For example, some individuals prefer an equity-rule, whereby rewards are 
allocated in proportion to the contributions made.  
 Procedural justice refers to the fairness of the processes used to decide those 
outcomes. For example, it is considered fair to provide workers with voice and to 
evaluate them with accurate procedures.  
 Interactional justice refers to the fairness of the interpersonal exchanges that occur 
during work. For example, whether or not one is treated respectfully.  
More recently, some scholars have divided interactional justice into two sub-factors. The 
first of these, interpersonal justice, pertains to the dignity and respect that one receives from 
others. The second of these, informational justice, pertains to whether one receives 
explanations and social accounts for events at work (Colquitt, 2001; Colquitt et al., 2001). 
Beyond these issues of description and structure, organisational justice research has 
tended to focus on four interrelated theoretical questions: (i) why justice at work matters to 
individuals, (ii) how justice judgements are formed, (iii) what are the consequences of justice 
and injustice, and (iv) what factors are antecedent to justice (e.g. Ambrose, 2002; Cropanzano 
et al., 2001; Greenberg, 2001). It is around these four core questions that justice research has 
begun to incorporate ideas and concepts derived from the domain of behavioural ethics. 
 
Why does justice matter? Content theories of fairness 
Discussions of fairness go back many centuries (Sandel, 2009). As social beings we often 
struggle individually and culturally with the problem of the fundamental tension between 
self-interest and belonging, between being the same as others and being unique, and with 
coordinating and responding to these same interests and motives in others (Fiske, 1991, 1992; 
Brewer, 1991). It is not surprising therefore that justice is a crucial feature of what it means to 
be a social being. Indeed, neuroscientific research suggests that a concern for fairness is hard-
wired into the human brain (Sanfey et al., 2003). For all of this empirical evidence, it is not 
readily obvious why people care about justice in the first place. Above and beyond their 
personal and material concerns, are there empirically demonstrable reasons why justice is 
important? Conceptual models that attempt to answer this question have been referred to as 
‘content theories’ because they attempt to identify underlying needs or goals that drive 
human concerns with fairness (Cropanzano, et al., 2001). 
In order to organise and integrate the various content theories, Cropanzano et al. 
(2001) argued for a multiple-needs model. They suggested that fairness met at least three sets 
of needs: 
 Instrumental models maintain that justice provides the best long-range 
outcomes for people, usually by allowing them to predict and control the 
process. 
 Interpersonal models of justice argue that fairness helps individuals meet their 
needs for positive social relationships and interpersonal standing among 
valued groups. 
 Deontic models of justice argue that fairness is important for its own sake. 
Individuals prefer to live in ethical social systems; these are also seen as more 
meaningful. Behavioural ethics has provided much of the impetus for this 
work. 
Evidence supports the multiple needs model (e.g., Colquitt et al., 2006; Goldman et 
al., 2008; Reb et al., 2006), and we use it to organise this review. We caution the reader that 
our presentation is only illustrative (for a more complete explication, see Cropanzano et al., 
2011). 
 
Instrumental models. Early organisational justice research was dominated by instrumental 
perspectives, proposing that individuals care about justice because fair systems are more 
likely to guarantee them valued economic gains, at least over the long-term. In its original 
version, Adams’ (1965) equity theory assumes justice is a comparative calculation of one’s 
inputs and rewards from a decision-making system (Moliner et al., 2013). Injustice is felt, 
therefore, when one is either over- or under-rewarded compared to a relevant other. Seminal 
procedural justice research also tended to take an instrumental view of justice, suggesting that 
fair procedures (such as providing employees with voice in decision-making) promote one’s 
control over, and thus trust in, the long term favourability of personal gains from that 
decision-making system (e.g. Thibaut and Walker, 1975).  
 
Interpersonal models. Research on procedural justice, while acknowledging that instrumental 
concerns are important, soon found that this perspective was unable to account for important 
phenomena in the real world. For example, individuals remained committed to institutions 
even when their outcomes were negative, but only when they viewed the process as fair (for 
reviews of this pioneering work, see Lind and Tyler, 1988; Tyler, 1990; Tyler and Blader, 
2000; Tyler and Smith, 1998).  
Tyler and Lind (1992) proposed a ‘group-value’ or ‘relational’ model. They argued 
that fair procedures matter because they give individuals a sense of their acceptance by, and 
membership in, desirable social groups (e.g. Tyler and Blader, 2000, 2003). Procedural 
justice helps one attain important relational as well as economic needs (Tyler and Degoey, 
1995; Tyler et al., 1996). While some dispute the difference between these ‘relational’ and 
‘economic’ perspectives, arguing that both are in fact instrumental self-interested models of 
justice (e.g. Greenberg, 2001), what isn’t in doubt is the very strong support in the literature 
for both (Cropanzano et al., 2011; Shapiro and Brett, 2005; Tyler, 1990; Tyler and Smith, 
1998).            
 
Deontic models: How behavioural ethics is informing this research. Despite the extensive 
theoretical and empirical support for instrumental and relational models of organisational 
justice, behavioural ethics researchers have observed phenomena that are difficult to account 
for using these theoretical frameworks. For example, work on ‘altruistic punishment’ has 
found that individuals will give up some of their own earnings to punish a harm-doer, even if 
they do not know the people who were allegedly wronged (Turillo et al., 2002). These sorts 
of findings have encouraged researchers to explore individuals’ potential moral motives for 
fairness (Cropanzano et al., 2001; Cropanzano and Stein, 2009).  Folger’s (1998) seminal 
work on the ‘moral virtues’ or ‘deontic’ model of organisational justice, argues that 
individuals care about fairness at work for its own sake (e.g. Folger et al., 2005).  
The deontic perspective on organisational justice also provides new insights into why 
third parties often react negatively (punitively) to the injustices experienced by others 
(O’Reilly and Aquino, 2011). Empirical support for the importance of deontic or moral 
motives for organisational justice is growing (for a review, see Cropanzano et al., 2003), with 
these studies often showing that individuals seek fairness at work even when they are 
personally disadvantaged by just decisions (e.g. Greenberg, 2002; Turillo et al., 2002).    
 
How are justice judgements formed? Process theories of fairness 
Earlier we saw that content theories suggest that there are a set of underlying human needs, 
and these can be met through fair treatment. Such a perspective, though useful, is 
conceptually incomplete. Researchers also need to specify how an individual evaluates an 
event with respect to these content needs. That is, models of justice need to articulate the 
cognitive and emotional processes by which fairness judgments are formulated. Cropanzano 
et al. (2001) refer to these types of frameworks as ‘process theories’ of justice. According to 
Goldman and Thatcher (2002), these theories fall into two general families: those that 
emphasize relatively careful and thorough cognitive processing and those that emphasize 
relatively superficial and heuristic processing (see also, Bazerman and Tenbrunsel, 2012; 
Bobocel et al., 1997).  
 
Relatively deliberate processing. Historically speaking, many seminal theories of justice have 
tended to assume that people make several judgments, some of which are reasonably 
sophisticated. For example, the venerable equity theory (Adams, 1965) posits that individual 
evaluations of justice are made via a deliberate and reasoned calculation of one’s inputs (i.e. 
skills, effort, performance) and outcomes (tangible and intangible rewards) in comparison to 
another’s. Injustice is thus perceived when these input-outcome ratios are felt to be positively 
or negatively imbalanced.  
A more recent model, which attempts to address equity theory’s limitations, is 
fairness theory. Fairness theory argues that a situation or event will be interpreted as unfair 
when three judgements are made by individuals, termed would, could and should judgements 
(Folger and Cropanzano, 1998, 2001). First, individuals must have a negative experience that, 
in turn, causes them to think of alternative ‘better’ scenarios. In other words, how would an 
alternate reality have felt? Second, individuals attempt to allocate blame for this negative 
experience. It is only when an individual or organisation can be held accountable (i.e. that it 
is not some outside agent or environmental factor that has caused the negative experience), 
and thus could have acted differently, that perceptions of injustice are likely to follow. 
Finally, the situation or event itself, and the actions taken by individuals or organisations, 
must have breached some ethical principle or moral code. In other words, the institution (or 
its agents) should have acted differently (Cropanzano et al., 2004).  While a growing number 
of articles show support for fairness theory (e.g. Gilliland et al., 2001; Kahn et al., 2013; 
McColl-Kennedy and Sparks, 2003), explicit empirical testing of this model is still relatively 
limited and more research is needed.  
 
Relatively automatic processing. According to Goldman and Thatcher (2002), other scholars 
have demonstrated that fairness judgments can be made relatively automatically, without a 
great deal of deliberate thought. Possibly the first time that this point was made explicitly, 
was when Lind (1992, 1995, 2001) proposed fairness heuristic theory. Lind maintained that 
individuals possess cognitive schemas representing just and unjust treatment. Violations of 
these schemas serve as a signal that something has gone wrong (Jones and Martens, 2009; 
van den Bos et al., 2001; van den Bos et al., 1997).  
Uncertainty management theory grew from this seminal work (van den Bos and Lind, 
2002). It assumes that the workplace presents employees with both opportunities for personal 
gain and for exploitation, and that this daily exposure to personal risk or uncertainty leads 
individuals to continuously evaluate the trustworthiness of the system and its agents (Lind, 
1995). However, in order to deal with the sheer complexity of relationships and interactions 
that one faces at work, one must rely on cognitive shortcuts and schemas when making these 
trust judgements.  
Through their experiences in work and life, people formulate “good enough” 
cognitive shortcuts. These are called heuristics, as they make judgments quicker and easier, 
though they sometimes compromise accuracy. Once developed, these fairness heuristics are 
repeatedly called upon (Lind, 1995, 2001). According to uncertainty management theory, 
decision procedures and interpersonal transactions make especially valuable heuristic tools. 
This is because all of the information is likely to be readily available, thereby allowing quick 
assessments to be made (van den Bos et al., 2001; van den Bos et al., 1997).  Conversely, 
distributive justice requires that one know the outcomes received, and perhaps also the inputs 
made, by others. Hence, distributive justice is often more difficult to calculate. This effect has 
received a considerable amount of empirical testing, with research tending to confirm these 
propositions (e.g., Hui et al., 2007; Thau et al., 2007).  
 
Process theories: How behavioural ethics is informing this research. The process theories of 
justice offer an important avenue for integrating behavioural ethics research. If fairness 
decisions are made through a series of cognitive steps, then there are a number of stages in 
which ethical considerations could intervene. A good example of this can be found in an 
important study by Schminke et al. (1997). These authors observed that individuals and 
philosophers tend to hold at least one of two ethical philosophies. Philosophical formalists are 
process-oriented. They tend to believe that action is ethical if it is consistent with rules and is 
in accord with normative standards. Philosophical utilitarians are outcome-oriented. They 
tend to believe that an action is ethical if it does the most good for the most people.  
Schminke and his colleagues (1997) proposed that ethical formalists – those who 
subscribe to a set of rules for guiding ethical behaviour – will be more sensitive to procedural 
justice concerns. Conversely, ethical utilitarians – those who believe ethical actions are those 
where outcomes serve the greater good – will be more sensitive to concerns of distributive 
justice. They found empirical support for these hypotheses (Schminke et al., 1997).  
 
What are the consequences of injustice? 
Past research has shown perceptions of distributive, procedural, and interactional justice (and 
overall justice) to predict a wide range of important work-related outcomes. This includes 
emotions (e.g. anger and sadness), attitudes (e.g. job satisfaction, trust in management and 
perceived organisational support), and behaviours (e.g. individual job performance, 
organisational citizenship behaviours) (see Cohen-Charash and Spector, 2001; Colquitt et al., 
2001). In short, the positive implications of distributive, procedural and interactional (and 
overall) justice perceptions are extremely well founded in the literature.          
 
Consequences of injustice: How behavioural ethics is informing this research. While justice 
and injustice have a number of important consequences for work organisations, a key insight 
has emerged from the behavioural ethics literature: Individuals often act to restore (what they 
see as) the loss of fairness in the workplace. These responses may be benign or, 
paradoxically, they may not be.  
Most intuitively, employees seek to restore fairness by eliminating or discouraging 
unfair conduct. For example, people will self-report their own misbehaviour (Martinson et al., 
2006), bring ethical issues to the attention of management (Treviño and Weaver, 2001), and 
sometimes will encourage whistleblowing (Seifert et al., 2010). Martinson et al. (2006) 
examined the role of organisational justice in promoting integrity in the scientific/academic 
community. Their findings suggest significant relationships between individual experiences 
of distributive justice and procedural justice violations, and their own open/honest self-
reporting of misbehaviour among a sample of scientists.                   
Other work has shown that individuals will act assertively to restore fairness, often 
engaging in retributive behaviour (e.g. Carlsmith and Darley, 2008; Jones, 2009; Tripp et al., 
2002). These scholars argue that mistreatment and felt injustice lead to moral outrage (Bies, 
1987; Bies and Tripp, 2012) and the desire to punish perpetrators. For example, employees 
may respond to unfairness by showing counterproductive work behaviours (CWBs), 
organisational deviance, sabotage, or aggression (Barling et al., 2009; Holtz and Harold, 
2013; Treviño et al., 2006; Zoghbi-Manrique-de-Lara, 2010). Unfairness may also promote 
cheating (Searle, 2003) and stealing (Greenberg, 2002). From the point of view of the 
wronged individual, these seemingly anti-social acts are justified, as a way to ‘even the score’ 
when someone has behaved unfairly (Bies and Tripp, 2001, 2004, 2012; Cropanzano and 
Moliner, 2013). 
 
What are the antecedents of justice perceptions? 
In an ideal philosophical world, decisions about fairness would be thoughtfully derived by 
considering relevant aspects of the situation (cf. Barsky et al., 2011; Blackburn, 2001). 
However, this is not the case, and our moral judgements are influenced by both mental biases 
and aspects of the situation (e.g. Appiah, 2008; Bazerman and Tenbrunsel, 2012; Connolly 
and Hardman, 2009; Cropanzano and Moliner, 2013). The descriptive and empirical 
approach, when applied to organisational justice research, has identified a number of 
antecedents that impact justice perceptions, though these are not directly pertinent to the 
fairness-relevant events at hand. These antecedents can be usefully organised by their level-
of-analysis: individual, interpersonal, and organisation-wide. 
Research into the effects of individual differences and organisational justice has itself 
focussed on a wide range of attitudinal and personality variables. For example, studies have 
highlighted how attitudes such as organisational identification (e.g. DeCremer, 2005), 
organisational commitment (Crawshaw et al., 2012), and trust in management (Brockner and 
Siegal, 1996) may moderate reactions to injustice. In particular, employees that identify with 
their organisation, are committed to it, or hold trust in management tend to be more tolerant 
when events do not go in their favour.  
Beyond these attitudinal effects, individual personality has also been shown to be 
important (Colquitt et al., 2006). Here we consider just a few examples. In their 
comprehensive meta-analysis, Barsky and Kaplan (2007) found that individuals high in 
dispositional positive affect reported more distributive, procedural, and interactional justice. 
Conversely, those who were high is dispositional negative affect reported less of the three 
types of justice (for a more complete review, see Barsky et al., 2011).  Likewise, Andrews 
and Kacmar (2001) found that as internal locus of control increased, respondents showed 
more procedural justice and more distributive justice.  
At the interpersonal level, there is a growing body of work exploring the role of co-
workers in influencing individuals’ judgements of, and reactions to, injustice at work (e.g. 
Colquitt et al., 2005; Elovainio et al., 2002). This research suggests that as employees form 
close workgroups, they tend to adopt the fairness judgments of their teammates (Li and 
Cropanzano, 2009a). Another interpersonal influence on justice perceptions is culture. While 
justice seems to matter to people all over the world, individuals from different nations do not 
always respond identically (Brockner et al., 2001; Erdogan and Liden, 2006; Shao et al., 
2013). Very generally speaking, there is evidence that western peoples place relatively more 
emphasis on justice, when compared to individuals from other cultures (Haidt, 2012; Li and 
Cropanzano, 2009b).  
At the broadest level-of-analysis, a number of researchers have investigated 
organisational-level fairness. In this regard, there is evidence that organisational structure 
influences justice perceptions (Schminke et al., 2002). For example, procedural justice 
appears to decline with increasing centralization, but it increases with increasing 
formalization (Andrews and Kacmar, 2001).  
 While justice researchers have explored various factors that influence fairness 
perceptions, the results have been somewhat ad hoc. The incorporation of behavioural ethics 
models into organisational justice has yielded rich insights at three different levels of analysis 
– the individual, the interpersonal, and the organisational. We briefly consider each below, 
illustrating the concepts with research findings.  
 
Individual – level antecedents of justice: How behavioural ethics is informing this research. 
Recent research has begun to examine the implications of individual’s cognitive moral 
development on ethical decision making processes. Kohlberg (1969) and Rest (1986) 
famously proposed that people develop their ethical predispositions though three stages – pre-
conventional, conventional and post-conventional. In other words, ethical behaviour is 
predicted not only by one’s awareness or judgements of morality, but also by one’s moral 
maturity (for reviews, see Bazerman and Tenbrunsel, 2012; Treviño et al., 2006).       
At this individual level, therefore, justice scholars have begun to test for the 
moderating effects of individuals’ cognitive moral development and moral motivation on 
their perceptions of, and reactions to, injustice (Cropanzano and Stein, 2009). For example, 
Myyry and Helkama (2002) showed that one’s cognitive moral development (moral maturity) 
may also influence one’s sensitivity to, and reliance upon, different procedural justice rules. 
Consistent with this, Greenberg (2002) reported that theft behaviour following a distributive 
injustice was significantly lower for those individuals with higher (conventional), rather than 
lower (pre-conventional), levels of cognitive moral development. In related research, Patient 
and Skarlicki (2010) studied the delivering of justice by managers. They presented evidence 
that managers were more likely to exhibit high interpersonal and informational justice in 
delivering negative news when they were high in trait empathic concern (see also Patient and 
Skarlicki, 2005). Moreover, this relationship between trait empathic concern and 
interpersonal/informational justice was significantly stronger for those higher, rather than 
lower, in cognitive moral development (Patient and Skarlicki, 2010).  
Another individual level contribution of behavioural ethics concerns work on moral 
identity (Shao et al., 2008). People who are high in moral identity view themselves as ethical. 
They consider moral conduct to be an important part of who they are as individuals. Those 
who are low in moral identity have a less firmly held view of themselves as moral actors. A 
number of studies have focussed specifically on the role of moral identity in predicting 
individuals’ retributive actions in the face of third party injustices. Skarlicki et al. (2008) 
examined individuals’ customer-directed sabotage behaviour in reaction to third party 
mistreatment (interpersonal injustice) by the customer. In experimental settings, they found 
support for the moderating role of moral identity. In other words, the relationship between 
third party mistreatment by customers and customer-directed sabotage was more pronounced 
for those employees high in moral identity. Skarlicki and Rupp (2010) have reported similar 
findings.     
Building upon this research, an experimental study by Rupp and Bell (2010) found 
that individuals’ reactions to third party distributive injustice were significantly different for 
those exhibiting retributive or moral self-regulation cognitions. Those exhibiting retributive 
norms were more likely to respond by taking action to punish the unfair third party, whereas 
those exhibiting moral self-regulation were less likely to punish the transgressor (Rupp and 
Bell, 2010). Their research is particularly interesting as it shows that one’s deontic response 
to third party injustices may not always be retributive.              
 
Interpersonal – level antecedents of justice: How behavioural ethics is informing this 
research. Interesting work has also begun to explore the impact of ethical leadership 
behaviour on individual justice perceptions. Mayer, Bardes and Piccolo (2008), for example, 
explored the mediating role of employees’ overall organisational justice perceptions in the 
relationship between servant leadership and individuals’ need satisfaction and job 
satisfaction.  
Taking a slightly different approach, Neubert et al. (2009) investigated the interaction 
between ethical leadership and interactional justice on their perceptions of ethical climate. 
They argued that through their role-modelling behaviours ethical leaders are organisational 
agents of virtue and, as such, ethical leadership behaviours should be closely related to the 
overall organisational ethical climate (Wright and Goodstein, 2007). Neubert et al. (2009) 
also proposed that a leader’s fair day-to-day interactions with their employees (i.e. high 
interactional justice) would further heighten their moral authority and leadership and thus 
their influence on individuals’ perceptions of overall organisational ethical climate. They 
found good support for these propositions in a self-report survey of 250 working individuals 
(Neubert et al, 2009).   
 
Organisational level antecedents of justice: How behavioural ethics is informing this 
research. At the organisational level, a number of ethically-orientated contextual factors on 
employees’ perceptions of, and reactions to, injustice have been identified. Models 
hypothesising, for example, the impact of an organisation’s external and internal corporate 
social responsibility (e.g. Collier and Esteban, 2007; Rupp et al., 2010), ethical climate (e.g. 
Treviño et al., 1998), and ethical leadership (e.g. Ehrhart, 2004) on individual justice 
judgements at work, have been proposed. To date the explicit testing of these ideas and 
models is limited, but again there are a growing number of studies.  
Weaver (1995) highlights the importance of effectively written ethical codes in 
promoting justice perceptions. He suggests, and finds support for, a relationship between 
greater explanatory rationales in written codes of ethics and individual perceptions of 
organisational procedural justice. In related research, Treviño and Weaver (2001) explored 
the interaction between employees’ perceptions of ethics programme follow-through (i.e. the 
organisation’s commitment to delivering ethical policy) and overall justice climate in 
predicting employee unethical behaviour. Supporting their hypothesis, they found that the 
negative relationship between ethical programme follow-through and unethical behaviour 
was significantly enhanced when overall justice climate was perceived negatively (rather than 
positively). They argue that ethical policy follow-through matters more to individuals when 
the overall justice climate is viewed negatively, as under these conditions individuals have a 
greater motive to behave unethically and retributively. Their findings provide further support 
for employees’ deontic motives at work.                      
 
The current special issue 
Each of the five papers that you can read in this special issue further builds new bridges 
between organisational justice and behavioural ethics. They thus help to give new answers to 
the four core questions of organisational justice research: Why does justice matter? How 
justice judgments are made? What are the consequences of injustice? What are the 
antecedents to justice perceptions? 
The first two papers explore important new connections between organisational 
justice and ethical behaviour by extending the so-called deontic model of justice. First, 
Folger, Ganegoda, Rice, Taylor and Wo (2013; this issue) provide a much needed theoretical 
reflection, and extension, on our understanding of deontic motives for fair and ethical 
behaviour at work. In particular, they highlight the potential tensions individuals face 
between the countervailing motivations of reactance (the right to behave in certain ways – 
free behaviours) and deonance (the obligation to behave in certain appropriate ways – non-
free behaviours). They argue that in trying to resolve these tensions, individuals may act in 
ways that they themselves perceive as ethical but other impartial observers do not. By 
theorising on these potential threats or challenges to deontic motives of justice and fairness, 
Folger and colleagues thus contribute further to our understanding of two main questions: 
why justice matters at work and, perhaps more importantly, how justice judgements are 
formed.       
Greenbaum, Mawritz, Mayer and Priesemuth (2013; this issue) also further our 
understanding of the deontic model of organisational justice, by exploring the moderating 
effect of moral identity on the relationship between third-party injustice and individual 
responses. They propose that individuals higher in moral identity are less likely to respond to 
their supervisor’s abuse of customers by initiating direct aggressive forms of organisational 
deviance. However, they are more likely to respond through forms of action that are higher in 
moral acceptance. This includes such actions as withdrawal (turnover intentions) or 
constructive forms of resistance. They argue that those high in moral identity are more likely 
to view organisation-directed deviance behaviours as inappropriate as they may cause harm 
to others and may also be seen as unethical or unfair in their own right. Withdrawal 
behaviours and constructive resistance, however, provide individuals with a deontic response 
to the supervisor’s unethical actions without causing harm to others or breaching their own 
ethical/moral values. They report general support for these propositions across two field 
studies.  
The final three papers are concerned with the delivery of justice by organisational 
authorities and, as such, they explore important new connections between organisational 
justice, unethical behaviour and different aspects of ethical leadership.  
First, Resick, Hargis, Shao and Dust (2013; this issue) explore the mediating role of 
moral equity judgements in the relationship between ethical leadership and employees’ 
discretionary workplace behaviours (avoidance of antisocial conduct and engagement in pro-
social behaviour). Moral equity judgements, they argue, are evaluations of specific actions or 
events in terms of their moral rightness, justice and fairness. As such, these evaluations 
provide a form of ethical evaluation that integrates both theories of organisational justice and 
behavioural ethics. Resick and his colleagues propose that ethical leadership will promote 
greater negative moral equity judgements of others’ workplace deviance (antisocial) 
behaviours and greater positive moral equity judgements of others’ organisational citizenship 
(pro-social) behaviours. They also propose that these negative and positive moral equity 
judgements will in turn regulate employees’ own behaviours, mediating the relationship 
between ethical leadership and employees’ own avoidance of antisocial conduct and 
engagement in pro-social behaviour respectively. They find support for these propositions.  
Hoogervorst, De Cremer and Van Dyke (2013; this issue) explore the conditions 
under which leaders are more or less likely to grant voice. Their study hypothesises that 
leaders are more likely to grant employees voice (enact procedural justice) when they 
perceive their subordinate has both a high need for control (and thus value voice 
opportunities) and also when they have a high need to belong to the organisation. They argue 
that leaders may not grant voice to individuals, even if they desire it (high need for control), 
if they feel that individuals may use this voice to cause harm to the organisation (i.e. those 
low in belongingness needs).  
Finally, Zhang and Jia (2013; this issue) focus on the moderating role of interpersonal 
and informational justice climate on the relationship between supervisors’ use of stretch goals 
and employees’ unethical behavioural responses. Stretch goals are by definition extremely 
difficult (if not impossible) and/or extremely novel (Sitkin et al., 2011).  Zhang and Jia 
propose a multi-level model, which explores the positive relationships between stretch goals 
and both unethical behaviour and relationship conflict. They hypothesise that interpersonal 
and informational justice climate will moderate these relationships. In line with uncertainty 
management theory, Zhang and Jia argue that leaders who promote a fairer team climate may 
reduce individuals’ concerns regarding the potentially exploitative nature of stretch goals. 
This, in turn, should reduce the likelihood of an unethical reaction or response to such goal-
setting strategies.  
 
Conclusion 
We hope to have provided the readership with a new insight into the potential opportunities 
that behavioural ethics research is affording organisational justice scholars in answering their 
core questions of justice at work. We firmly believe that a better integration of these two 
important disciplines can only be of benefit to both the academic and practitioner 
communities, and that through such integration we can further improve employees’ working 
lives and hope that the five papers presented in this special issue will convince the reader that 
this direction is fruitful.   
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